Thursday, 18 December 2025
Brandjacked for social media advert fraud: Microcelebrities' experiences of digital crime in South Africa
Written for readers interested in the virtual epidemic of digital crime and online scams.
The Noakes Foundation established the Fake Celebrity Endorsement (FCE) research project in 2023 to address research gaps regarding the brandjacking of South African public figures in fake social media adverts. I’m delighted to share that the FCE's first peer-reviewed article is now available in a special Cybercrime issue from Acta Criminologica: African Journal of Criminology and Victimology. {Please note that the journal's ‘Open Access’ policy initially provides restricted access via the SABINET archives. These are available via university libraries’ annual SABINET subscription for SA_ePublications (Sabinet African Electronic Publications). There is a 12-month open access embargo from the date of publication/loading on CRIMSA’s website, so expect external access to be available from January, 2027.}
The article was written by myself, Dr Taryn van Niekerk, Dr Karen Heath and Mr Japhet Mutomb Kayomb to begin covering the cybervictimization experiences of a hard-to-reach sample of South African public figures. This post provides some context to the (i) neglected digital crime problem that our scholarly contribution spotlights before summarising (ii) the article's literature review, (iii) the research and its key findings, (iv) their broader implications, plus (v) suggested areas for future research:
i. Digital crime cybervictimisation as a neglected research problem in the Global South
A massive footprint of digital crime looms right across South Africa. Pumped through a hypnotic body of popular social media platforms that include; Alphabet's YouTube, Bytedance's Tik Tok, Meta's Facebook, Instagram & WhatsApp, Microsoft's LinkedIn and xAI's X. Forced labour cybercrime compounds pump billions of scam adverts through these platforms daily into the path of locals' scrolling fingers. Once clicked on, algorithms push even more scam slop to users. Once tricked, victims are completely unsupported. They have no recourse against cybercriminals cloaked behind expensive privacy services. Nor will an apology be forthcoming from unscrupulous and unrepentant advertising hosts. Notably, Meta earned 16 billions of dollars of ill-gotten gains in a year from sharing criminal clientele's adverts (Horwitz, 2025).
In South Africa (SA), it can be unclear to victims which authorities to report these crimes to. Financial victims will not be reimbursed by their bank, and cannot expect support from law enforcement or other local authorities (Noakes, 2025). This complete lack of societal support for victims of 'digital crime' distinguishes this online crime from 'cybercrimes'. These target corporations, whose employees are often better positioned to respond with the support of corporate technical teams and cybersecurity countermeasures (Olson, 2024). For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, SA businesses were targeted with spear phishing emails impersonating colleagues, line managers, and senior executives (Minnaar, 2020: 45). Executives in blue-chip companies using cyber defence services, such as ZeroFox, benefit from proactive monitoring and countermeasures versus executive impersonation. In stark contrast, even the most influential public figures outside corporate cannot access such costly support for fighting digital crimes.
Their scale approximates an epidemic, with Africa being among the fastest growing regions in terms of cybercrime activities (Kshetri, 2019). Its rapid growth of digital crime follows patterns in the Global North, where cybercrime now represents up to half of all crime (Aebi, Caneppele & Molnar, 2020). Growing at 15 percent a year, the economy of cybercrime would be the third largest in the world if it were considered a nation. Only the economies of the United States and China are larger (Bo, Franceschini & Li, 2025). A recent taxonomy of scams (Zhou et al., 2024) identifies that many different types contribute to a rapidly evolving fraudulent economy:
1 Financial fraud (e.g. phishing “employment” scams)
2 Identity theft (impersonation and brandjacking of small businesses)
3 Internet health scams (weightloss ads brandjacking doctors)
4 Advert fraud (marketing fake “pop concert” tickets)
5 E-commerce and product scams (non-existent “flash sales”)
6 Online harassment (cyberstalking, cyberbullying and doxxing)
7 Social engineering (business phone fraud and cold calling scams)
8 Crowdfunding and charity scams (a fake crowdfunding site purportedly linked to a political party’s “fundraiser for student bursaries and groceries”)
9 Lottery and prize scams (unsolicited messages claiming recipients have won prizes, and that they should pay a fee or provide their bank details)
10 Employment scams (impersonate hiring companies to request fees for job placements)
11 Romance and relationship fraud (cyberdating that leads to “employment” offers)
12 Spam (unsolicited SMS and email communications featuring marketing offers or scams)
13 Miscellaneous (QR phishing code scams that elude email security software)
2 Identity theft (impersonation and brandjacking of small businesses)
3 Internet health scams (weightloss ads brandjacking doctors)
4 Advert fraud (marketing fake “pop concert” tickets)
5 E-commerce and product scams (non-existent “flash sales”)
6 Online harassment (cyberstalking, cyberbullying and doxxing)
7 Social engineering (business phone fraud and cold calling scams)
8 Crowdfunding and charity scams (a fake crowdfunding site purportedly linked to a political party’s “fundraiser for student bursaries and groceries”)
9 Lottery and prize scams (unsolicited messages claiming recipients have won prizes, and that they should pay a fee or provide their bank details)
10 Employment scams (impersonate hiring companies to request fees for job placements)
11 Romance and relationship fraud (cyberdating that leads to “employment” offers)
12 Spam (unsolicited SMS and email communications featuring marketing offers or scams)
13 Miscellaneous (QR phishing code scams that elude email security software)
In stark contrast to the high prevalence of digital crime, little research addresses people’s cybervictimisation experiences in responding to online scams. In response, we wrote a paper that starts covering South African public figures whose reputations were brandjacked for fake endorsements. This ever-evolving digital crime can involve six scam types: 1. financial fraud, 2. identity theft, 3. internet health scams, 4. advert fraud, 5. e-commerce and product scams, plus 7. social engineering.We also address how digital crime content spans a myriad of digital services: from (A) ads on popular social networks to "research reports" on academic networks; across (B) search engine results, blogs and online forums; from (C) clickbait news to fake business index listings, plus shopfronts; and (D) onto local fulfilment via global retailers or local sellers.
The inspiration for our paper started in 2019, from when the reputations of Prof Tim Noakes and Dr Michael Mol were repeatedly brandjacked for fake endorsements, primarily in Facebook ads for non-existent products (e.g. ketogummies). Dr Karen Heath, myself and other reps worked to raise public awareness of these scams, and to stop them on social networks. We didn’t have much success with the latter, especially on Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, where most victims reported being scammed. With Prof Noakes and Dr Mol's revictimization being an intractable problem in 2022, I identified a gap in scholarship on this particular digital crime. The Noakes Foundation's Academic Free Speech and Digital Voices project launched the FCE as a new Digital Visibility Risks theme. It catalysed novel interdisciplinary work between health communication, psychological and digital forensic experts for understanding cybercriminals’ fake endorsement adverts on social media platforms, and celebrities experiences in responding. In 2023, Dr Adrie Stander (Advanced Digital Forensics) did an Open Source Intelligence investigation that established the vast extent of the scam. This investigation also revealed that the scammers used professional tools, such as CloudFlare. This made even locating their continental origin impossible.
ii. Literature review
The team’s ongoing literature review suggested an opportunity to respond to an urgent call for 'exploratory cybervictimisation research that can help address ever-expanding patterns of online victimisation’ (Halder, 2021, 4-6). Just as FCE micro-frauds typically evade detection by authorities, they also seem by-in-large to have escaped scholarship. There seemed to be no scholarly accounts of SA celebrity influencers’ lived experiences of cyber-victimisation, brandjacking, and impersonation. This contrasted to many press reports- we tracked how over 50 SA celebrities had been brandjacked by 2024. Brandjacking is the allegedly illegal use of trademarked brand names on social network sites (Ramsey, 2010, p. 851).
The psychologist and victimisation expert, Dr Taryn van Niekerk, led our interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of celebrities' and their reps' accounts. Taryn also led a literature review on cybervictimisation across the North-South divide. It unpacks the development of Northern scholarship on cybervictimology, plus the growing literature on this topic from the global South. Importantly, it highlights the gap in knowledge around the subjective experiences of digital victims, and more specifically, microcelebrities. Our paper proposes that the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of victim identity within global Southern cybercriminological scholarship can be reimagined. We further suggest what is required to develop a body of scholarship that yields insights into cybervictims' needs, and routes to recourse.
iii. Research and key findings
During the preliminary research process, we tested our approach by interviewing representatives from The Noakes Foundation. In late 2024, Price Green Creative Studio approached over 50 SA celebrities’ agents to request they participate in cybervictimisation research. Almost all in this hard-to-reach sample declined, despite generous incentives. Such research resistance is an interesting topic in itself, as Professor Michel Anteby describes in The Interloper (2024). The agents’ common feedback was that their celebrities were concerned about the potential for revictimisation. They seemed unfamiliar with how research ethics would protect them. For example, as part of securing ethical approval, the FCE organised cybervictimisation experts to provide psychological support should interviews have proved traumatising.
We completed fieldwork in early 2025, with: Dr Michael Mol and a rep; Shashi Naidoo; Prof Tim Noakes; and his representatives having done separate, semi-structured interviews. Their feedback supported an exploration of how individuals’ positions as public figures shaped their lived experiences as victims of complex webs of digital crime. The findings showed how fake endorsements and brandjacking were experienced as relentless and as interwoven with other forms of online fraud, highlighting the deep intricacies of their mechanisms. These digital crimes varied in their severity, ranging from impersonation to sextortion for child pornography, leaving trauma and emotional chaos in their wake. They were furthermore aggravated by their unknowable and unpredictable nature, leaving many unanswered questions. Each celebrity victim was left without closure i.e., who the cybercriminals were, where the crime originated, where they might next be brandjacked online, and if it would ever end! Finally, as novices in cybercrime fighting, both the celebrities and their representatives attempted varied techniques to stop the work of ‘savvy cybercriminals’; however, many described this battle as grim and having minimal impact.
iv. Broader implications from our research
These findings have important practical implications for SA’s regulatory environment, digital crime reporting and law enforcement authorities, plus victim support:
New laws are urgently needed to regulate social media platforms that profit significantly from scam advertisements. For example, Meta’s internal documents describe how it fears regulation as the only credible threat to its scam advertisement business (Horwitz, 2025). Regulation could mandate reporting on advertising fraud, impose penalties for slow takedowns of scams, and provide local micro-agencies (e.g., Meta Trusted Partners based in South Africa) with the opportunity to take down scammers’ accounts and content. Artificial intelligence watermarking could also be mandated for identifying AI-generated content to aid in tracing its provenance.
The epidemic of digital crime may largely go unreported and remain invisible to local law enforcement authorities. This gap must be addressed by the state increasing support for formal channels to report digital crime. Regular, publicly accessible reports on digital crime and cybervictimisation could be mandated to raise awareness while also supporting platform accountability.
It seems likely that there will be a long wait before regulatory and enforcement measures are in place to protect victims of cybercrime. In the interim, an anti-digital crime network could be established to advocate for and provide support to victims and future targets of online scammers’ digital crimes. This network could raise funds for the neglected area of digital crime scholarship in the Global South, tackling important gaps, such as who is vulnerable and what types of preventative education are most impactful.
Addressing this paper’s meaningful questions about ‘risk’ and victimhood in the online domain can offer opportunities for more extensive dialogue about cybervictimisation experienced by the broader public. As a digital crime, fake celebrity endorsements target private individuals and the general public with limited access to resources for combating fraud. Many of the financial victims are elderly, with little disposable income.
We trust that our research may additionally inform legal and social media policies that can better support South African victims of this crime. Such a contribution seems highly salient for the challenging environment that SA law enforcement faces in resolving online crimes.
v. Suggested areas for future research
Our study offers an exploratory focus on a novel area of research and recommends that future studies develop this focus on microfrauds and their cybervictimisation of civilians. Research on cyber victims must gain traction to motivate digital platforms and law enforcement to better assist individual victims. This study illuminated just three SA public figures’ cybervictimisation experiences, but other local celebrities’ experiences may differ according to their contrasting roles and types of exposure. There is also an opportunity to explore public figures' experiences in the Global North. Scholars can also address how realities ‘on the ground’ prevent brandjacking cases from being stopped, and what some solutions might be.
There are many future research directions that could enhance the understanding of digital crimes and cybervictimisation in the Global South. In particular, researchers could expand our understanding of the online experiences of victimisation beyond public figures to include everyday citizens. Scholars can urgently contribute to our understanding of who may be vulnerable, how they are targeted online, and the damage they experience. Academics can also contribute to a growing understanding of how individuals can be better empowered to guard against the myriad of digital crimes from which labour compounds and Big Tech profit. For example, little is known about how multi-cultural anti-crime communications might be improved for more effective outreach. The development of knowledge by SA scholars on cybervictimisation, digital crime reporting, and regulatory remedies, along with anti-crime education, seems vital for assisting citizens in combating the overlooked frontline of digital crime.
To further mobilise this body of work to ensure SA’s protection of digital consumers, this study offers several recommendations for future research and the development of policy. In stark contrast to the well-resourced cybercrime fighting efforts in the corporate sector, digital crimes that target ordinary individuals are often neglected. Therefore, there are significant incentives for expanding this body of work on digital crime, particularly from a Global South perspective, where cybercriminological scholarship is growing and requires further insights into victims’ experiences and support. In terms of theoretical contributions, this study’s utilisation of IPA as a qualitative tool to gain insights offered meaningful observations into the relational experience of victimhood shared by the participants. It demonstrated how cybervictimisation is experienced as persons-in-context and contributes to the extensive literature on IPA by providing novel insights into digital forms of victimisation.
Help support our future research
The size of the digital crime problem is vast, but little scholarship of it exists. This is directly related to how the global leaders behind research funding far prefer prioritising making grants to tackle the "harms" (unproven) of (mis-, dis- and malinformation). This MDM- with no A focus, seems to be an addictive topic for censorious 'hall monitors' in the Communication and Media Studies fields.
Not so for The Noakes Foundation which has worked with Price Green Creative Studio to prepare a funding proposal 'Protecting South Africans from “petty” digital crimes: a case for urgent funding'. It proposes to tackle key areas in (v) future digital research, and research funders are welcome to contact me for a copy on noakest@cput.ac.za. I also welcome advice on any related external funding opportunities linked to digital crime in SA.
Not so for The Noakes Foundation which has worked with Price Green Creative Studio to prepare a funding proposal 'Protecting South Africans from “petty” digital crimes: a case for urgent funding'. It proposes to tackle key areas in (v) future digital research, and research funders are welcome to contact me for a copy on noakest@cput.ac.za. I also welcome advice on any related external funding opportunities linked to digital crime in SA.
Gratitude
Our article developed from a collaboration between two public benefit organisations. I greatly appreciate The Noakes Foundation’s and Dr Mol's support, plus the research participants’ contributions. The qualitative research contribution of psychologist Dr Taryn van Niekerk was integral to our manuscript. In particular for leading the literature review and applying a critical interpretative phenomenological approach’s analysis from Big Q Qualitative Specialists (Pty) Ltd. Thanks too, Dr Adrie Stander and Dr Alize Pistidda-Scheenstra for digital forensic advice. And Mrs Megan Lofthouse for assisting with the project’s fieldwork, plus Dohne Green from Price Green Creative Studio for driving outreach to celebrities' agents. The authors also greatly appreciate the legal advice of John Spengler and Adam Pike of Pike Law regarding local laws and regulations that cover fake celebrity endorsements and social media advertising frauds. Thanks too to Dr Ashwill Phillips and Professor Francois Steyn for their journal’s positive response to our abstract's submission. Plus for their assistance in the review process and organising helpful reviews that helped particularly with addressing our article’s context and contributions to the field. We also appreciate The Criminological Society of Africa (CRIMSA)'s for its role in supporting and publishing Acta Criminologica.
In the press
Lyse Comins from the Mail and Guardian has covered our concerns in Meta criticised for slow action as deepfake adverts target South African celebrities (2024).Comments welcome
I am particularly interested in comments related to digital crime research funding leads, scholarly collaborations, or offers related to anti-digital crime networking support.
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Location: Cape Town, Western Cape Province, RSA
Cape Town, South Africa
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